Niccolò Machiavelli has acquired a prominent position in the history of political thought. Machiavelli is probably most notorious as a teacher of evil, a political realist advising tyrants and a proud proponent of Machiavellism, a devilish politics that astoundingly bears his name. This image, however, is far from being the only one. Sorting through the history of political thought, Machiavelli suddenly appears ubiquitous and dressed in various disguises. Historical interpretations of Machiavelli's writings range from a predecessor of totalitarianism to a (...) proponent of subversive republicanism or even radical democracy, from the first political scientist to have discovered the ideal of value-free political analysis, to a liberal, a fascist, or a communist avant-la-lettre to name just a few. (shrink)

While the history of science in Polish language has a long history, both intellectual and institutional, it became less visible internationally following the fall of the Iron Curtain. This article looks into the institutional state of history-of-science writing in Poland, and discusses several key focal points that emerged in recent years. By distinguishing between the core history of science, written at institutions devoted to this discipline, and broader academic discussions concerning science's past, I claim that, in recent decades, more important (...) topical and theoretical innovation has come from what we can term the “esoteric” circle (referring to Ludwik Fleck)—that is, scholars who do not identify themselves as historians of science. Given that those scholars from abroad who are interested in Polish history of science are in fact general historians, we get a strong impression that we are witnessing a deeper turn in the field, one with diminishing specialization and greater attention paid to situating science in a broader range of societal processes. (shrink)

This article introduces a collection of studies of biological concepts crossing over to other disciplines and nonscholarly discourses. The introduction discusses the notion of nomadic concepts as introduced by Isabelle Stengers and explores its usability for conceptual history. Compared to traveling and interdisciplinary concepts, the idea of nomadism shifts the attention from concepts themselves toward the mobility of a concept and its effects. The metaphor of nomadism, as outlined in the introduction, helps also to question the relation between concepts' movement (...) and the production of boundaries. In this way conceptual history can profit from interaction with translation studies, where similar processes were recently discussed under the notion of cultural translation. (shrink)

Ukrainian science and its terminology in the nineteenth century experienced a number of twists and turns. Divided between two empires, it lacked institutions, scholars pursuing it, and a unified literary language. One could even say that until the late nineteenth century there was a possibility for two communities with two literary languages to emerge – Ruthenian and Ukrainian. Eventually, both communities and languages merged. This article tracks the meanderings of this process, arguing that scholarly publications played a crucial role in (...) shaping the standard for the scientific language. The article follows the biography of the naturalist Ivan Verhrats’kyi, the author of the first dictionaries of naturalist terminology in Ruthenian in 1860, a translator and author of textbooks, and the head of the Mathematical–Naturalist–Medical Section of the Shevchenko Society in L’viv. He thus shaped many Ruthenian, and then Ruthenian–Ukrainian scholarly projects. Initially successful with his approach to making the Ruthenian scientific language vernacular, in the 1890s his approach was losing ground to the internationalization of vocabulary and to the growing pressure toward the unification of Ruthenian and Ukrainian. Finally, in the beginning of the twentieth century, Verhrats’kyi became marginalized within the Ukrainian scholarly community. By discussing the history of a minority language within imperial structures, I argue that the media in which scholarly work was published requires special attention. In the Ruthenin–Ukrainian case, they determined the standard for scientific language. Lacking professional journals, Ruthenian scholars published in the 1860s–late 1880s in popular newspapers and in school textbooks, requiring them to use a language that was near to the spoken tongue of the Habsburg province. Once the political situation changed, favoring Ruthenian–Ukrainian unification, and scholarly journals appeared and transgressed the imperial boundary, the favored language had to be transimperial, ousting out the vernacular. (shrink)

During the summer of 1900, the Chemical Section of the Society for the Promotion of Russian Industry and Commerce in Warsaw published a very special booklet in which prominent philologists debated proposals concerning adjustments to chemical nomenclature. Several issues were discussed, including systems of classification of chemical compounds, new specialist terms, and which element names to select among the many then in use. Chemists translated and modified these proposals while strongly disagreeing with using philological expertise. But both the booklet and (...) the debate were novelties within discussions on chemical terminology, which provides an opportunity to examine the peculiarities of such endeavors. This article examines this special moment in the history of chemistry when chemists ceded (partially) their authority over their subject to philologists. I discuss how this episode was shaped by the low grade of academic professionalization in the Polish-language scholarly community and the practical needs of industry, which engendered different habitus among scholars debating chemical issues. This paper asks what language was for chemists and philologists and which epistemic ideals were linked with it. I argue that this episode was a form of interdisciplinary interrogation in which philologists and their arguments were instrumentalized for the needs of chemists. (shrink)

Arnošt Kolman (1892–1979) was a Czech mathematician, philosopher and Communist official. In this paper, we would like to look at Kolman’s arguments against logical positivism which revolve around the notion of the fetishization of mathematics. Kolman derives his notion of fetishism from Marx’s conception of commodity fetishism. Kolman is aiming to show the fact that an entity (system, structure, logical construction) acquires besides its real existence another formal existence. Fetishism means the fantastic detachment of the physical characteristics of real things (...) or phenomena from these things. We identify Kolman’s two main arguments against logical positivism. In the first argument, Kolman applied Lenin’s arguments against Mach’s empiricism-criticism onto Russell’s neutral monism, i.e. mathematical fetishism is internally related to political conservativism. Kolman’s second main argument is that logical and mathematical fetishes are epistemologically deprived of any historical and dynamic dimension. In the final parts of our paper we place Kolman’s thinking into the context of his time, and furthermore we identify some tenets of mathematical fetishism appearing in Alain Badiou’s mathematical ontology today. (shrink)

The main question of our article is: What is the logical form of statements containing expressions such as “… is true” and “it is true that …”? We claim that these expressions are generally not used in order to assign a certain property to sentences. We indicate that a predicative interpretation of these expressions was rejected by Frege and adherents to the prosentential conception of truth. We treat these expressions as operators. The main advantage of our operational reading is the (...) fact that it adequately represents how the words, “true” and “truth,” function in everyday speech. Our approach confirms the intuition that so-called T-equivalences are not contingent truths, and explains why they seem to be—in some sense—necessary sentences. Moreover, our operational readingof truth expressions dissolves problems arising from the belief that there is some specific property—truth. The fact that we reject that truth is a certain property does not mean that we deny that the concept of truth plays a very important role in our language, and hence in our life. We indicate that the concept of truth is inseparable from the concept of sentence and vice versa—it is impossible to explicate one of these concepts without appeal to the other. (shrink)

This book is the first to trace the origins and significance of positivism on a global scale. Taking their cues from Auguste Comte and John Stuart Mill, positivists pioneered a universal, experience-based culture of scientific inquiry for studying nature and society—a new science that would enlighten all of humankind. Positivists envisaged one world united by science, but their efforts spawned many. Uncovering these worlds of positivism, the volume ranges from India, the Ottoman Empire, and the Iberian Peninsula to Central Europe, (...) Russia, and Brazil, examining positivism’s impact as one of the most far-reaching intellectual movements of the modern world. Positivists reinvented science, claiming it to be distinct from and superior to the humanities. They predicated political governance on their refashioned science of society, and as political activists, they sought and often failed to reconcile their universalism with the values of multiculturalism. Providing a genealogy of scientific governance that is sorely needed in an age of post-truth politics, this volume breaks new ground in the fields of intellectual and global history, the history of science, and philosophy. (shrink)

Berichte zur Wissenschaftsgeschichte, Volume 44, Issue 4, Page 339-351, December 2021.

In in the second half of the 1940s, Jan Patočka emphasized the essentially negative character of human existence. He thus found himself in the neighborhood of Sartre’s existentialism, Heidegger’s philosophy of being, and Hegel’s dialectic, and at the same time in opposition to schools of thought which either completely reject the substantive use of “the nothing,” such as Carnap’s positivism, or relativize it, like Bergson. It is the latter polemic, Patočka’s with Bergson, which is discussed in this article. The concept (...) of negativity in Patočka basically refers to the idea that human existence is defined by a capacity to adopt a distance toward what is pre-given, be it the reality of the physical world or the established habits and rules of a particular society. Negativity qua distance has in Patočka an absolute character. It is this claim that he defends in his critique of Bergson. The article attempts to reconstruct Patočka’s position. I claim that the wager on absolute negativity does not make Patočka a nihilist, but a philosopher of a negative holism, and, in a sense, even a moralist. Above a reconstruction of Patočka’s stance, I spell out some reservations focused especially on the systematic meaning of Patočka’s recourse to negativity. I suggest that negation is an indispensable part of a more complex existential structure Patočka is aiming at. The terms he uses for this structure include “thirst for the absolute,” “thirst for reality,” “restlessness of the heart” and “desire.” To translate these allusions onto a general plan, it is useful to talk about the capacity to establish differences that matter. As general as it seems, this turn of phrase can grasp both Patočka’s emphasis on negativity, and his emphasis on the absolute, the latter – nevertheless – not residing in a distance from being, but in differences established, maintained and abandoned by ourselves within being. (shrink)

According to some phenomenological accounts of intersubjectivity, self-awareness precedes and makes possible our understanding of others. Consequently, an "egological account of consciousness" is a precondition for a viable theory of intersubjectivity.1 While Edmund Husserl embraces this assumption of the primacy of self-awareness, Jan Patočka seems to elaborate the opposite stance. As Patočka puts it, in the "contact and in the mirror of the other we encounter ourselves, for the first time."2 Is self-awareness a precondition for an intersubjective encounter, or is (...) it the other way around? Husserl and Patočka seem to espouse exactly opposite claims.Nevertheless, the picture I draw here is more nuanced. On the one... (shrink)

The paper offers a parallel exposition of Ricœur and Patočka in the narrow context of their respective reading of Husserl’s Fifth Cartesian Meditation. At the same time, it follows a broader goal, namely to confront a hermeneutics of the self with a phenomenology freed of subjectivism. Ricœur claims that phenomenology presupposes interpretation. Under this assumption, even the paradox of intersubjectivity in the 5th CM can be restated as an interpretation of the self/other difference. Patočka in his interpretations of the 5th (...) CM drew on his own observations regarding embodiment and a possible self-awareness of the bodily subject. He claims that the first form of explicit self-reflection is made possible through the other. It is against the background of this claim that he gives his original reading of the “appresentation” of the other as leading to the appresentation of myself in the other. At the end, the paper localizes the point in which Ricœur’s hermeneutics of the self and Patočka’s non-subjectivist phenomenology part ways: it is the possibility of the self to be oneself. While the emphasis in Ricœur and his hermeneutics of the multiplied forms of alterity is put on being oneself as another, in Patočka it is through another that being oneself is possible. (shrink)

Book review: Raimond Gaita, Sdílené lidství. Přemýšlení o lásce, pravdě a spravedlnosti, Červený Kostelec (Pavel Mervart), transl. Jan Petříček, 2022, 248 p.

An Interview with Klaus Nellen by Jakub Homolka about the rescued manuscripts of Jan Patočka and the establishment of the Patočka archive at the Institute of Human Sciences in Vienna.

J. Gorczyca doziert Ethik an der Gregorianischen Universität in Rom. In seinem Entwurf einer christlichen Ethik geht er über die traditionelle Auffassung einer philosophischen Ethik hinaus, einer Ethik, die sich der deduktiven Methode bedient, um mit Kraft der Vernunft normative Prinzipien für das menschliche Handeln systematisch aufzubauen. Dagegen betrachtet Gorczyca die philosophische Ethik aus der anthropologischen Perspektive, d.h. aus der Perspektive des Subjektes des ethischen Denkens. Der objektive Hauptinhalt seiner Ethik bekommt dadurch eine neue Dimension.

Even though science strives to transcend national differences, scientists in the multi-national, multi-lingual, multi-ethnic Habsburg Empire could hardly avoid being caught up in a web of competing ethnic, national, and imperial interests. Where should their identities and loyalties lie and where should they seek support for their work? At the level of the empire as a whole? One of its component kingdoms or principalities? Other institutions? What audience should they write for, and in what language? Or, from the point of (...) view of their patrons, how could science be used to promote unity and develop culture and identity? This fine essay collection on The Nationalization of Scientific Knowledge in the Habsburg Empire, 1848–1918 explores a variety of solutions with which scientists and scientific institutions experimented.The editors’ introduction, by Mitchell Ash and Jan Surman, is most concerned with the historiography of nationalism, nation formation, center–periphery relations, and po .. (shrink)

This special issue addresses the debate on personal identity from a phenomenological viewpoint, especially contemporary phenomenological research on selfhood. In the introduction, we first offer a brief survey of the various classic questions related to personal identity according to Locke’s initial proposal and sketch out key concepts and distinctions of the debate that came after Locke. We then characterize the types of approach represented by post-Hegelian, German and French philosophies of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. We argue that whereas the (...) Anglophone debates on personal identity were initially formed by the persistence question and the characterization question, the “Continental” tradition included remarkably intense debates on the individual or the self as being unique or “concrete,” deeply temporal and—as claimed by some philosophers, like Sartre and Foucault—unable to have any identity, if not one externally imposed. We describe the Continental line of thinking about the “self” as a reply and an adjustment to the post-Lockean “personal identity” question. These observations constitute the backdrop for our presentation of phenomenological approaches to personal identity. These approaches run along three lines: debates on the layers of the self, starting from embodiment and the minimal self and running all the way to the full-fledged concept of person; questions of temporal becoming, change and stability, as illustrated, for instance, by aging or transformative life-experiences; and the constitution of identity in the social, institutional, and normative space. The introduction thus establishes a structure for locating and connecting the different contributions in our special issue, which, as an ensemble, represent a strong and differentiated contribution to the debate on personal identity from a phenomenological perspective. (shrink)

According to some interpreters, Foucault's encounter with the Greek and Roman ethics led him to reconsider his earlier work and to turn away from politics. Drawing mostly from Foucault's last and hitherto unpublished lecture course, this paper argues that Foucault's turn to ethics should not be interpreted as a turn away from his previous work, but rather as its logical continuation and an attempt to resolve some of the outstanding questions. I argue that the 1984 lectures on parrhesia should be (...) interpreted as Foucault's philosophical apology, as an attempt to defend himself against the charges of moral and epistemological nihilism, which were raised in response to his earlier work. In his last lectures, the Nietzschean Foucault somewhat surprisingly describes his earlier work as authentic Socratic philosophy and as ethical practice of freedom. In the conclusion, I assess the plausibility of Foucault's apology and speculate in which direction his work might have developed, had it not been cut off by his death. (shrink)

This article intends to shed light on the political and security developments in Yemen that ultimately resulted in the Saudi-led military operation in this country. It discusses the political background behind the Yemeni revolution of 2011, its positive outcome in the shape of the results of the National Dialogue Conference and the reasons for the collapse of the efforts to stabilize Yemen.

This article explores book of poems entitled Requiem for Saddam Hussein and Other Poems for the Poor in Spirit by Konrad Góra in the light of animal studies. Looking at the poetic and beyond poetic activity of its author, this work reffers to Joanna Żylińska's question about ethical living founded on understandig of life both as zoe and bios. Think of the special opposition of village and city is trying to read this book in connection with mentioned vision of life. (...) These both areas shows presentifications and redefinings of persona in poems from Requiem and beyond poetic activity. By concentrating on poems specific for „nature” and „civilization this research will show how the mechanism of subordinating bare life works and how it concerns to both sides of the opposition of village and city. This article ask also for non-victims community, position and power of modern literature and involvment. (shrink)

Cognitive architectures have often been applied to data from individual experiments. In this paper, I develop an ACT-R reader that can model a much larger set of data, eye-tracking corpus data. It is shown that the resulting model has a good fit to the data for the considered low-level processes. Unlike previous related works, the model achieves the fit by estimating free parameters of ACT-R using Bayesian estimation and Markov-Chain Monte Carlo techniques, rather than by relying on the mix of (...) manual selection + default values. The method used in the paper is generalizable beyond this particular model and data set and could be used on other ACT-R models. (shrink)

Narrative identity theory in some of its influential variants makes three fundamental assumptions. First, it focuses on personal identity primarily in terms of selfhood. Second, it argues that personal identity is to be understood as the unity of one’s life as it develops over time. And finally, it states that the unity of a life is articulated, by the very person itself, in the form of a story, be it explicit or implicit. The article focuses on different contemporary phenomenological appraisals (...) of the narrative account. The survey of this partly critical debate is followed by concluding observations concerning a possible phenomenological theory of personal identity. (shrink)

W artykule omówiono ważniejsze argumenty przeciw operacjonizmowi Percy’ego W. Bridgmana sformułowane na przestrzeni ostatnich dekad oraz przedyskutowano operacyjne sposoby definiowania czasu w mechanice klasycznej oraz nierelatywistycznej mechanice kwantowej. O ile w mechanice klasycznej nie napotyka się większych trudności w sformułowaniu operacyjnej definicji czasu, o tyle w formalizmie teorii kwantowej zadanie to staje się niemożliwe. Co, niezależnie od dyskusyjnego statusu czasu w mechanice kwantowej, prowadzi do ogólniejszego pytania, czy można pogodzić mechanikę kwantową z podejściem operacyjnym.

A key component of the susceptibility to cognitive biases is the ability to monitor for conflict between intuitively cued “heuristic” answers and logical principles. While there is evidence that pe...

Locke claims that a person’s identity over time consists in the unity of consciousness, not in the sameness of the body. Similarly, the phenomenological approach refuses to see the criteria of identity as residing in some externally observable bodily features. Nevertheless, it does not accept the idea that personal identity has to consist either in consciousness or in the body. We are self-aware as bodily beings. After providing a brief reassessment of Locke and the post-Lockean discussion, the article draws on (...) phenomenological arguments that show the body as lived, that is, lived as one’s own body, but also possibly as “other” or “strange.” Against what has been claimed in recent writing, especially in literature on Merleau-Ponty, the author argues that the “mineness” of the body and its “alterity” are not two mutually exclusive features. In the final part of the article, the author suggests that the becoming strange of one’s own body may legitimately be considered as a prominent experience of what it means to be a person. (shrink)

Anthropomorphism is a phenomenon that describes the human tendency to see human-like shapes in the environment. It has considerable consequences for people’s choices and beliefs. With the increased presence of robots, it is important to investigate the optimal design for this tech- nology. In this paper we discuss the potential benefits and challenges of building anthropomorphic robots, from both a philosophical perspective and from the viewpoint of empir- ical research in the fields of human–robot interaction and social psychology. We believe (...) that this broad investigation of anthropomorphism will not only help us to understand the phenomenon better, but can also indicate solutions for facil- itating the integration of human-like machines in the real world. (shrink)

Mezi jednáním a důvodem existuje zásadní vztah: není činu bez důvodu. Lze z toho však vyvodit, že je-li dán důvod, je dán i čin? Může mít čin dostatečný důvod? Studie zkoumá dvě podoby dostatečného důvodu : příčinu a premisu. Fenomenologická teorie motivace se staví jak proti myšlence, podle níž důvody jsou příčiny, tak proti přesvědčení, podle něhož důvody jsou premisy. Přínos fenomenologického výkladu motivace netkví především v představě, již rozpracoval Paul Ricoeur, že důvody jsou přítomné vědomí, nýbrž v originální paralele, (...) již rozvinul Merleau-Ponty mezi perceptivní a praktickou motivací. There seems to be a fundamental relation between action and reason: no action without a reason. But does this mean that the reason, once it is given, brings about the action? Can an action have a sufficient reason? The article distinguishes two forms of the sufficient reason: the cause and the premise. The phenomenological theory of motivation argues against the idea “reasons are causes” as well as against the idea “reasons are premises”. The novelty of the phenomenological account of motivation consists not in the assumption, developed by Paul Ricoeur, “reasons are present to a consciousness”, but in the more original analogy developed by Merleau-Ponty between the perceptual motivation on the one side and the practical motivation on the other. (shrink)